what can change the nature of a man

I was in another rabbit hole but found some more possibly useful insights into why some transphobes, specifically certain (not all, maybe not most) “gender critical” radical feminists want the “sex not gender” label so much, and there may be ways in which some of those might be shown that what they fear and what they want is equally possible within a trans-inclusive framework. In turn, this also helps me highlight some strengths – recognizing also weaknesses – of the “reclaim transsexual” perspective I have been approaching for a while. This is a fairly chaotic narrative, just to warn.

First, let’s define sexed biological properties as those that meaningfully show variation that would not exist were it not for sexual reproduction being a thing that happens (as in, the lineage of sexually reproducing life is a directed acyclic graph where nodes are sexual reproduction events). That includes all the sexual characteristics of bodies as usually considered. That variance for each property defines one dimension in a sex continuum, and we can name and align the poles of each if the system is binary (as opposed to e.g. ternary or some other weirder thing – this does not collapse the continuum into just two states, merely defines and aligns an axis).

Given this we can then talk of sexed biology as a high-dimensional phenotype state space. We make no assumption that an individual sits at the poles of any axis, or the same pole for multiple axes. Moreover, we make no assumptions on correlations between axes (though we recognize such) and we do not at this stage require that for a given individual, its position on any one axis follows from any specific given cause (though we recognize that for a majority of animals, most of their sexed properties reflect the process of sex determination in that species). There is no principal difference between endogenous and exogenous processes – the breasts on a statue were carved by a person choosing to do so, but so long as that person recreates something which is there in the world they have gotten to know and is familiar with because of sexual reproduction in the past (i.e. nursing-capable mammals evolving breasts because that facilitates reproduction of their species, which is a sexual reproduction, such that if it had not been, mammals would not have been variable in this regard to this extent), that exogenous process still yields a sexed biological property – a sex characteristic, at that. A rock randomly tossed by the sea to achieve a somehow busty form may have the same shape, but the shape in that case is not a sex characteristic because if there had not been sexual reproduction, it would still be there, standing out against all the flat rocks around it. Similarly, my vagina and vulva were carved in the shape my surgeon recognized evolution gave other women. Had those evolved different anatomy, my surgery would similarly have yielded different anatomy.

For purposes of this discussion, I want to separate out some sexed properties and label them as “gendered” more specifically than “sexed”. These are traits which, within the individual considered to possess them, all are constituted by actions: feelings, thoughts, memories, direct actions, including both those held/done by a person, and held/done about a person by others. My surgeon looking at me as a woman is him gendering me a woman, as is his scalpel in my flesh. However, the shape of the flesh that results, within me as the person whose “sex” is referenced, is not something solely describable as something I feel or do, so it is a sex characteristic as well as a way in which someone genders me. That spoken of as “sex roles” or “gender roles”, expectations and beliefs and feelings about men and women, habits and tendencies of men and women in thought and emotion and deed, those are all also gendered traits. I believe it may be possible to say this, more or less, as that “gender” are the ways in which sex characteristics have consequences by way of (human?) subjectivity. Where those consequences become inscribed into a persistent body matter rather than fluid body action substrate, they again also become sex characteristics of the one in which they are inscribed, whereas the seeing and recognizing of those characteristics in an onlooker is the body that is observed being gendered in relation to the onlooker. Moreover “matter” is broadly defined. Fictive persons have matter in this sense too, for example. And the substrate underlying a behaviour – for example, if there may be some brain physiology that makes a person feel sameness with some bodies, difference from some bodies, thus creating a “gender identity” – then that substrate is a sex characteristic if its variation would not be there were it not for sexual reproduction being something humans do, whereas the manifestation of this in behaviour – feeling gender dysphoria, for example – would be an aspect within gender.

We could try to summarize the content so far. Sex characteristics are variations in bodies that would not exist absent sexual reproduction of a species. Gender are consequences of sex characteristics mediated by subjects except insofar and where they again become inscribed into matter.

As long as we stay within this scope (and here are things like, “have a womb”, for example), we can make precise statements about capacity and state of individuals that means only what they say. E.g., has a cervix. Might need screening for lesions on that. We now come to the work by several others which constitutes “(biological) sex” in an overarching sense as a “context-dependent summary of a phenotype space”. There may exist the perfectly aligned and binary polar individual, who for any axis of the sex characteristic continuum space (which may have infinite dimensions as we can consider sometimes infinite compatible ways of describing something) we can think of, will fall cleanly on the “male” or “female” side. However, real bodies are probably always more variable, with some axes cleaving one way, others another, even for those who are not considered intersex, and of course medical transition induces these changes also. But regardless, there is not a single privileged way of partitioning sex characteristic phenotype space into “biological males” on one side, “biological females” on the other. There are many such way – analogous to how species delineation is inherently subjective, pragmatic. And the important question that today’s culture wars ask is this: which partition of this space should we use? And this is where “sex” as context-dependent becomes an important possibility.

It is clear we could choose reductive definitions, “body which has or had or would, absent deliberate modification, possess gonads that produce large/small gametes relative to the gamete size range of its species”. But that is not the only possible choice, nor is it “naturally” the best, even if some of the alternatives might seem to be less straightforward to phrase in closed form. There is a lot of variability not captured by that definition which affects our lives, sometimes in ways which matter much to our well-being, and which in relevant ways are/are not aligned with our bodies as ours, as entities which we are sovereign over, or exert deliberate agency over.

In those situations where we are not merely defining a sub-range (e.g. “endocrine sex” or “reproductive sex” or “karyotype sex”), but seeking an overall descriptor, then that serves the purpose of highlighting, for a person, what we lead with versus what is exceptional and unexpected. The same person could be sexed in this sense as e.g. “I’m a man, but I don’t have a penis.” in some context, or “I’m a woman but I have a beard, high testosterone and a flat chest” in the same context, for example. The thing first listed – that which is baseline, that all else modifies – is the least likely to be missed, whereas the modifiers are what we more often have to remind about. If I tell my MD I am female, I may need to remind her that I cannot be pregnant as I don’t have a uterus. So this will determine what situations we are in, which interactions becomes more or less cumbersome or awkward, but also often what set of expectations and prejudices – what gender, if you will – that people will default to with me, until they know me enough for a more nuanced view, if they ever will. Accordingly it will determine how and if I am most frequently misgendered, and will be a main determinant of my dysphorias. If I was conceptualized as a man on dating sites, this would not represent to lovers what kind of body (in touch, sight or smell) they would end up with, though it would let them, too, know that I cannot get pregnant. It would first and foremost make them see me in all the regards that I am not like the people I feel a need to be like, and the regards that I am like the people I feel a need not to be like. The errors made would matter, in the space of who I see reflected in the eyes of others, would matter a lot.

Furthermore I consider a person’s view of themselves, including if they have a deliberate project to make themselves a certain type of human, as those who transition typically do, to be generally more important for representing that person than the comfort or ease of anyone who is not that person. Each is sovereign architect of their own personhood, if they take an active role rather than accept what was assigned at birth. We can default to that initial assignment and frequently must in absence of any other indications, but when someone sets out to reassign, then that is their choice and the fact they now are a product of design rather than by accident makes parts that followed by design higher priority for me, and for you if you are like me. Anything else would be to treat persons as objects rather than as subjects. Dysphoria is also a factor – throughout history trans folk have sought to be understood as the sexes we assigned ourselves rather than those our parents assigned, despite all the issues that came with doing that. Many of us died for this, that is how important it is. It could be argued that in resolving ambiguity into “baseline” vs “exception”, we should generally place as “baseline” that which follows from the earlier acting cause, which is acted on by the causes of the “exception” to introduce them, to communicate causal order. However, that assumes that we give higher weight to what happens to be the case than to what someone fights to make, which we might not. It is equally worthy, I think, to place at “baseline” that which we have been able to achieve, and at “exception” that which we as yet have not succeeded to change, so long as we actually do aspire to change it. This is a view in which a single cornerstone already is a house that just has not, for the most part, yet been built. It is not the most commonly expected meaning of words but its value lies in recognizing agency, aspiration and self-determination. The closest analogy of course are that adoptive parents are parents whose reproducing bodies did not generate their child, whereas non-adoptive parents are parents because their reproducing bodies generated a child. As we accept that, so should we here accept exogenously induced “biological sex”.

Accordingly, the need and decisions of a person has to be prioritized in representing that person. The only moral way to build a society and a language and a shared space of concepts is to let each person decide which of their sex characteristics should count the most for the overall assignment of what “biological sex” they are considered to have. This decision reflects and is motivated usually by our wishes, needs and desires as manifest through our gender identity, which will mean that the characteristics of the sex we assign ourselves are the ones that should generally count the most for which label we are assigned, whereas the unwanted and hurtful reminders, the characteristics of the sex we were originally assigned, those are not part of the plans we ourselves have for our body, and are not causing us happiness if they count for much, since that would assign us into a sex where we are misgendered, dysphoric and unhappy. So we choose, for the most part, to reassign ourselves, and accordingly, the moral choice for others is also to take up and affirm that reaffirmation and acknowledge the sex we assigned ourselves. If there is an ambiguity where not all our sex characteristics line up, then someone needs to make a decision. For animals in research, this is the scientist operationalizing – assigning – their sex. For someone who has not spoken up to the contrary, even in the stillness of their own heart, we must default to birth assignment or the like. But where a person feels that one aligned subset of their sex characteristics are what they want other people to expect about them, rather than to discover as exceptions, then that subset of characteristics matters more for how the ambiguity is resolved into an assignment than any other sex characteristics they have. This in turn reflects how we want to be understood by others, which is a component of our gender identity, and what parts of ourselves we want communicated also matches our aspirations. We want to be like some people, so the parts of us that are brings us the most joy in a relative sense, and those parts also becomes those we most want others to have in mind when thinking of us, compared specifically to what a competing sex label would bring up. This is a motivation for resolving ambiguities in favor of the chosen label we transition toward.

It is important to note that “biological sex” in this sense still is nothing but a summary statement of our sexed characteristics (splitting them into baseline and counterpoint, as it were, becoming cause and modifier for cis persons, and success and remaining obstacles for trans persons). It is about the body and nothing else. In my case, it is saying “the marks estrogen and surgery left on my body are the parts of me I want others to recognize more than any misaligned sex characteristics I have, so I am a woman; my karyotype and some of the epigenomic organization, while sometimes necessary to mention, are not something worth making central in a summary of my body such as I want my body to be known and interacted with by you, whereas those former ones are as they show how I am not so different from other women”. We are not making up some sort of astral body. We are not denying or ignoring any characteristic, merely declaring them warranted or not to be part of what others ideally would expect from us. We are not imagining any characteristic to be there which is not. We are merely making a decision on which characteristics are more or less important in the narrative we wish for others to have with us, and anyone respecting our well-being or agency should adhere to that.

Where does this leave us? Well, for the reductive, gamete-size-is-all definition, there will be a number of predictions people will make that will be correct, and a number that will be wrong. For someone like me, it would mispredict most day to day ways in which I am embodied and in what people have to expect from me. For someone prior to any medical intervention, there would by chance be a few sex characteristic continuum axes where the person fell closest to the pole linked to the sex they have self-assigned, and if it is the case that the substrate underlying our gender identity also exists, as I believe it does, in cis people, then that too constitutes a sex characteristic; for those traits they would be mispredicted. Both of us would have our agency disrespected, and experience various forms of suffering from implicit and explicit misgendering and exclusion and dysphoria. Even if we consider only such suffering that reflects the label not reflecting those parts of us that are actually mispredicted – so for this purpose not considering also the very real suffering we have from, say, others seeing us and seeing someone lacking the capacities we in fact do lack, like the right reproductive ability, even then we end up with suffering in regards to traits that matter particularly to us. So a certain amount of suffering, which by contrast would not take place under a definition respecting our self-assignment on the basis of those traits being the parts of us that should matter.

Along that alternative path, on the other hand, lies some forms of suffering that comes if our self-assigned sexes are considered. These involve things like needing to sometimes ensure a medical provider knows we do not function fully as other men or women, or people perhaps assuming we have a certain form of fertility which we do not. It also includes any discomfort other people may end up having – seeing someone in a rest room that comes across as too tall, perhaps. I won’t elaborate here other than to say that we ourselves are the most important stakeholders of our identity and embedding in the world. Clearly less damage is done this way, overall, certainly when that is considered. Aside from consequences of espousing the one definition or the other, one could see a value perhaps in a simpler definition, an economy of thought, parsimony. To the extent someone claims this applies here in favor of the gamete essentialist definition, I would claim that is less important than the practical consequences and also is balanced by a similar elegance of ideas under a framework where a person’s agency in their own life is held as a core tenet.

The framework above still has some limitations to its liberatory potential. For the above to be applicable in resulting in a re-assignment of sex to another than was assigned at birth (which makes someone, quite literally, transsexual – sex assignment opposite to their birth assignment), there must be enough ambiguity of sex characteristics (which is what medical transition intends to cause, and where “full” transition theoretically also would count – less and less ambiguity but still resulting in a reassignment in trans to the birth assignment) that the person finds important enough that what is gained from having those be placed in focus to the extent that having the corresponding assignment means, is more than what is lost from having the remaining sex characteristics lose focus to the corresponding extent. There must be enough of you that it is sufficiently important to you that others expect from your sex label, that this importance outweighs concerns you have over other parts of yourself then not being expected, even though you possess them. The latter part should be quite trivial as we rarely want others to expect our dysphoria-inducing parts except where strictly necessary. Still, this introduces a requirement (though individually thresholded in a “do you want X more than you want Y” kind of way) of both having undergone some medical transition, or be intersex, and caring enough that the characteristics so affected are understood by others. The “some” and “enough” are intermingled, and must satisfy the person self-assigning. It follows that several of us feel the need to do as much medical transition as we can so that we will feel more securely within our reassigned sex even so. In some sense this therefore also gatekeeps the “my sex is actually <NOT ASAB>” transsexualism in a transmedical manner. I have yet to find a way around that, but for now, one would see this concept of defining sex and transsexualism as needing the complementarity of more work on what “male/man” and “female/woman” means within the space of gender, and an auxiliary transgender liberatory framework that can expand beyond the transsexual framework.

Last there may be one factor playing into this, and here we get to what I thought of as a new idea – is it possible that a “sex is really just gonads” view would have liberatory value? Because I suspect that trans-exclusive radical feminists sometimes believe it has. They posit “sex is just gonads and leaves you otherwise free” as a counterpoint to some spectre of gender-as-sex-of-the-soul, strawmans us as somehow being in favor of gender roles or stereotypes, which of course on the surface is absurd to anyone who met trans people. But if we are generous to the idea, what do we find? One could argue that keeping sex a small concept makes it easier to teach how it does not constrain anyone’s life path. However, the model I present here above does not involve gender roles or stereotypes. It expands an idea of “biological sex” from a single tangible attribute to a cluster concept of attributes where the membership threshold is allowed to reflect priorities and aspirations of the person whose sex is assigned. It remains a statement about bodies, even where it implies the existence of gender identity as a descriptor of how we are happy or unhappy in different areas of sexed phenotype space. The claim that doing so reifies sex as something large or complex, or sends the memetic signal that sex should be important, may be consistent, but are those consequences really so sizable? I cannot think they are. And even then, we serve a stronger function still in signalling how birth-assigned biology is not destiny. More of those who see us will take away that their genuine will matters, so in fighting patriarchy, we provide more than we cost, which of course also are why social conservatives are so happy to team up with trans-exclusionary radical feminists against us.

Accordingly, all in all, I argue that an inclusive “biological sex” definition which incorporates our needs and our choices in determining whether to validate our self assignments, if we make them, is morally superior and minimizes suffering, now and as we move into the future. Under this definition, the question “what is a woman?” can indeed be answered as “an adult human female”, where “female” applies to all whose assigned sex is that, whether that is a birth assignment that was retained, or a self re-assignment made along a trajectory of self-determination, which they undertook sufficiently far that they feel strongly enough that the “female” sex characteristics induced by transition are important enough reasons on their own to motivate reassignment of sex label out of the consequences doing so will have.

Where we may benefit from speaking up, and perhaps win some few people over, is in the concept of a trans-inclusive radical feminism based on the above. It would center sex over gender in at least some regards, acknowledge sex as assigned/reassigned to reflect aspirations, needs and medical steps taken, and decouple the resulting transsexualism from gender roles and gender norms (not, however, from gender identity or gender label, both of which may be better to understand within a framework of sex). Highlighting how gendered ritual can be anything from oppressive through neutral to resistant, complex, culturally contingent, reflect intersecting axes of power, just as much for cis and trans persons. Recognizing both that a person may be transsexual independently of their transgender status and vice versa, and that the one aspect in practice will be relevant context for the other (e.g. how many people find their way into one through the other, and may go through consecutive phases also e.g. discovering gender nonconformity only after a sex transition). Radical in the sense that one actively would question why a person assigned a given sex must become anchored in gender norms as a result, yet also recognizing each does what they do for a reason, and that gendered superstructures, when consensual, might not always warrant abolishing.

I’d also warn against a potential pitfall in that context, namely that the search for a “gender norm neutral” label is challenging. There is some hope certainly for some that by saying “this is all just a neutral statement about the body”, and/or choosing a more specific term to use (e.g. “womb haver”) one rids oneself of gendered baggage of the words. But if, say, “female” replaces “woman”, or “AFAB” replaces “female”, and so on, I believe it highly likely that the de facto meaning of the replacement term will glide to eventually also imply norms (“oh, that’s just like birthing parents are – nurturing at own cost even”, “that aggression is so typical for an AMAB person”…) because the material circumstances of our lives, and the makeup of our minds and brains, and our baggage, those all have to connect to somewhere, and they will find the “new word for woman/man” and attach to it. Overusing those more specific terms will bring the gendered baggage down on them the same and any liberatory potential they have when used in this manner won’t last. Better to take terms, widen them to be inclusive, and then note that statements about those categories are statistical rather than essential. Examples here: “Women and other birthing parents” recognizes many women do birth, and also recognizes some non-women do, and further uses the literal othering to try to ensure “women” does not swallow those up. It is entirely opposite to an expression like “women and trans women” which is redundant except in few situations where “trans and cis women” for example is sought. Accordingly, if we have concerns that it is a counterliberatory practice to retain e.g. “woman” or “female” as a term since they might somehow reify interconnectedness between different characteristics as well as to social roles, most likely any replacement would end up doing this also to the same or worse extent.

dryad dance

Came across and was stupidly affected by another discourse thread, one side current of the whole “what is biological sex” mess of the last week. In this case views from an intersex person, which does mean I want to acknowledge the challenges faced by this group rather than minimize them; obviously I cannot speak for them, and mostly I can just speculate.

In this case the person was expressing how either full-on denial of “biological sex” as a concept, or equating it with gender, would be denying and making invisible their experiences. This bothers me because as noted, the idea of/how someone being “biologically male/female” matters to me; I experience dysphoria from being concepted on the wrong side of such a division. For this perspective I have usually argued several things:

“Biological sex” without further definition is poorly defined. This is not the same as denying it, but rather saying that it is not a straightforward, simple, obvious categorization; it is a construct insofar as that we have to decide on boundaries for spectra of bodily properties (effective bimodalities are still continua). That does not make it unreal, only definition dependent.
Moreover, we can and should reference that biological property of the brain self-identifying (my “opt-out”/”opt-in” terminology) as a deciding factor where necessary in defining “biological sex” for organisms where this makes sense, like ourselves.
Third, the properties of the sex property continua are not static under transition but changing.

This challenges the position of the person whose words I read in that there are circumstances where we would let gender, in fact, be the deciding factor on the “biological sex” of a person. In response to claims of intersex erasure or validity denial as a result of this, I would respond two things – the first, that the overall composite level leaves intact the various properties (which are the more concrete features affecting either a dyadic or intersex person’s existence). The second, that this may have relevance as a response to the experiences of intersex people – the failure of acknowledging that assigning biological sex first and foremost should be left up to ourselves underlies the oppressions some intersex people do face, as far as I understand it.

(Elaborating briefly there on my own limited understanding – there exists a class of intersex cis people assigned the sex they identify with without anything unusual noted at birth; with intersexuality discovered during puberty or even much later as part of a reproduction issue. These individuals in most cases will see themselves wholly and fully male/female as assigned, whether they acknowledge an intersex label or not in addition. Some such individuals may be trans (and imagine the challenges of being a CAIS XY trans man – you have XY karyotype and testicles, but cannot ever respond to testosterone in any way), and may recognize trans experience as well. More vocal in the discourse are those who were nonconsensually operated on as children to enforce either assignment made, often without being informed. To me it seems that for either group, the problem lies first in not being allowed to make one’s own assignment of “biological sex” and whatever cascades off of that, and second in the experience of having atypical characteristics.)

So I would say that recognizing either scope of experiences and needs comes with no requirement for a coherent “biological sex” concept to omit self-identification as one aspect, nor for that type of concept to not be recognized as complex. Recognition of the biological continua themselves go a long way and are also part of my trans experience – I seek to changed sexed properties of my body also for their own sake, I suspect. That those properties themselves (and the nonconsensual medical treatment downstream of them) affects and informs many intersex experiences is obvious, and while acknowledging and labeling it may be a choice in some regard, it is not an unconstrained source. I am not saying either trans or intersex people choose their bodies, or live lives unaffected by their bodies, quite the opposite. Intersex identity is no more fake than trans body dysphoria is.

The person whose words I read made the odd claim that the sex assignment of bodies is better described as labeling as typical or atypical, than as male or female, but this feels absurd – literally most characteristics typical of a male body would be considered atypical for a female body and vice versa; the typical/atypical, while clearly determining whether an early-diagnosis intersex person experiences surgeries they do not consent to or not, is only defined once one has clarified what it is typical/atypical in reference to. More fully, surely recognizing we are assigned (and later, perhaps, re-assigned under own volition) male or female is not controversial? The course those processes takes then leaves us with cis/trans, dyadic/intersex experiences which we may end up acknowledging.

That is, I posit we can recognize the very real and important influence of sexed body properties for the life histories of intersex people without 1) adhering to a simple composite “biological sex” definition that cannot incorporate self-identification and 2) failing to recognize how sexed body properties can be changed. I do not see where there is visibility or recognition of intersex lived experiences and the impact of the body that is lost under these systems.

The point was well made that comparing dyadic trans people to intersex people fails to recognize the involuntary nature of much of the intersex experience (something, however, which also applies to the trans experience in absence of transition), and also that while the cause may differ, a medically transitioned dyadic body may well occupy much the same region in the spaces of sexed property continua as an intersex body does. To deny this latter part is to say we somehow still are always only confined to our birth-assigned sexes. It is also important to notice both that 1) many intersex individuals experienced tremendous trauma and 2) many dyadic trans people would intensely want to be intersex, even knowing all that, because that would mean in some small ways being further away from one’s assigned sex.

Further the point was made how trans identity could not exist without a gender assignment at birth system; this is wrong; if we self-assigned genders later (sort of what I did?) then the discrepancy with the body norm (regarding, again, sexed body properties) within those sexes/genders would still cause dysphoria and a need to transition.

The quip was made – echoing that which I heard from TERFs – that unless there was a reality to biological sex, then defining us as trans would not work in the first place, in absence of reality of source/target sexes. As noted above, my definitions of male/female, men/women are not independent of sexed body properties, simply recognizing the whole as allowing for opt-out/opt-in (to degrees, thereby enabling nonbinary existence also here). That is, once more, this definition need neither be circular nor deny reality of transition outcomes, and is no more “just a social construct” than anything else.

the aeaea manifesto

Last few days have had so much energy eaten by discourse that I need to put my thoughts down, I have work to do and a life to live. This may not be eloquent or useful, but will summarize my responses to two recent papers; one of which I read in detail; both of which end up screenshotted all across trans twitter and so keep reactivating me. For some reason in combination I end up in apathetic dysphoria freeze/spirals like I have only very rarely done post-transition, and it has been relevant to understand why.

First I recently wrote of: literature review (Gliske, 2019) of brain scan studies identifying dysphoria correlates, only new thing being author postulates these are causes not symptoms and that direct modulation may (some day) alter them, reducing dysphoria. Such conversion therapy need not hinge on the flawed theory of the author, but is a more general philosophical question now gradually actualized – we are developing both invasive and non-invasive brain impact methods (transcranial magnetism, electrodes…) and it does not seem entirely unreasonable it will become possible with a willing subject to combine with methods like in EMDR – activate certain pathways and selectively dampen/erase them over and over, as a way to alter habitual reactions or the response to thoughts and memories.

Any such method will of course be highly variable in efficacy, take many years to get past initial horrorshow stage, and with side effects. The closest I can see possible in the case of dysphoria is something like an augmented PTSD or phobia treatment, where eventually one feels just a dull, neutral ache which activates no panic. It is the modern version of “learn to endure it”. There exists trans people who try now doing the latter; many of whom are in impossible situations where they feel they can never become cis passing, never accepted, etc; those would probably – will probably – become the test subjects. Some will consider themselves successfully “cured”, others will not. For those, I suppose I do not begrudge them whatever they do, I am simply sad for them and angry for a world where puberty made so much so difficult for some of us.

Others – me, and perhaps most of us – would neither accept the perfect “become cis of your AGAB” magic pill or the above laser-guided exposure therapy “learn to endure it” treatments. We want to be what and who we are, we just want smoother and more effective transition. It is the potential consequences for us that frighten me. Essentially, when there has emerged – and I can’t really afford to just blanket say it cannot – some sort of trial therapy like the above, with a handful of detransitioners touted as “successes” because they no longer have debilitating dysphoria manifestations, then there will begin to be voices saying that we already then have that sort of conversion therapy as an alternative. Those voices will be heard by conservatives and by health insurance systems. If it is cheaper to make us less depressed and suicidal by conversion therapy, than to let us transition socially and medically, they may not deny us the latter legally, but would have a much easier time denying us support (social and insurance-wise) in pursuing it. What we suffered from being read and understood wrong, and in the wrong kind of bodies, would be considered our own faults, since we did not choose to have our painful, impossible wish lobotomized away.

Here then the second paper (Byrne, 2019). I had not planned to read it, but sitting down now to collect my thoughts I did. I technically have more formal training in philosophy than in neuroscience but am more outside this field, so perhaps I miss out on sensible reading aspects someone better anchored would – somehow I doubt that. Byrne is head of philosophy and linguistics at MIT, and in this his first paper on sex and gender he took help by noted anti-trans voices including Blanchard, Stock and also anti-trans trans people like Andrea Long Chu and Debbie Hayton. From the start I think there is a fundamental disconnect here between Byrne’s views and mine, as he believes words have some sort of meaning which exists beyond the pattern of their use, interpreted most generally. This is where perhaps actual trained philosophers could tell me that this in fact is a widely accepted view, though it still is not mine – I see words and concepts as patterns of human perception, action, emotion, position and thinking, with anything than the full set of all human thought at any moment being a symbolic (statistical) simplification, and with statistical and imperfect correspondence to anything outside subjectivity. Never mind that though.

Byrne wants to defend the concept that “woman” should mean “adult human female”, and that it explicitly refers to something biological, not something social. Broadly speaking he lists various ways in which people broadly use the concept and speak and think about womanhood to mean, usually, just that, and he paints this idea as something persecuted and controversial among philosophers but not among sensible ordinary people. The text is rambling, tone widely shifting, type and extent of reasoning fluctuating and he makes some casually thrown in problematic assertions, chief among them, from some few anecdotes, that third gender people across the world really mostly have been femme gay men (my intuition being: many many people throughout history, if given the option to transition legally and medically, would have; many ambiguous states were second best options, just like mine was, but of course not all). He also randomly makes up an intersex condition instead of using the perfectly applicable CAIS XY one, then goes on to say that intersex women neither are women or female, but that they should be called that, and treated as such, out of kindness – second class womanhood, and very jarring against the rest of the text which highly praises some sort of honesty to imagined concepts; if one’s concepts means one should not speak and act according to them, then are they really sensible concepts to hold? He also willfully ignores how “cis woman” or “birth-assigned woman” is perfectly serviceable for addressing people where that holds.

All in all the argumentation is thin, repetitive and there is little to summarize beyond, “based on various assumptions, this is how we use this term, or ought to use it”. Instead I best summarize my impressions by my counter position. This is that, as noted, words and concepts are their usage, therefore sometimes very fuzzy. Words like woman (girl, etc.) have cultural and contextual meaning that go far beyond the biological; this ambiguity does not cause us any problems in practice, we understand to use them in this way and are able to give them specifying qualifiers when we have to. Many important usages of the term has nothing to do with biology and everything with social positions; in many cases such usage overlays partly with a usage that references biology. Again, this is not in practice confusing. We are able to communicate this just fine. So saying the concept is solely biological is not true, because only some forms of it is.

That said, I have no issue at all with those forms of the womanhood concept referencing “adult female humans” a lot of the time they are used. This is because I do not use the term “female” in the same way that Byrne does. First, that term too has the same multiplicity of effective meanings as do “woman”; we use it also to reference social positions and symbols a lot of the time, not merely biological. Here I know there is disconnect – my use of the word is spreading but not as accepted yet. More so still within the areas that this discourse actually is about, namely the status of trans and intersex persons. My concept and linguistic use of “female” in the biological sense applies to any person that identifies as such. I have written of it elsewhere but will briefly reiterate this idea.

Essentially, as a biologist, I reject the unqualified use of sex/male/female as biological terms. There are any number of sexed properties – within anatomy, endocrinology, reproductive lineage tracking, genetics, gene expression, and for animals – human ones also, perhaps – in behaviour. These are not discrete; we can define an infinite number of ways of tracking aspects of the same concept, so one could speak of as many separate but correlated sex characteristic continua as one wants. Usually but not always they are bimodal but not separable. I believe that some philosophers apply a “cluster definition” to define “male” and “female sex” out of this, but in the end, as for any other concept in biology, we need to make definitions when we establish terms which are not compelled from the data, but are choices we make – this is where also STEM concepts become social constructs. We cannot take an average of an infinite number of dimensions, so there is not a single obvious way to choose where in this space to put a boundary between “male” and “female sex”.

Much easier in each subcategory. My body has largely female endocrinology, for example, no real reproductive capacity any longer, largely male karyotype, intermediate anatomy of a lot of tissues. And in that aspect of neurology and behaviour which is also part of my biology, I declare myself “female”. When trying to decide then on that short hand which is (unqualified) sex, or biological sex, I have the following concept, and it is one I try to propagate to others, and which I want eventually also to propagate in research literature: default to anatomy, gonads and karyotype in that order, but if the person themselves opts out of either maleness or femaleness, or opts into either femaleness or maleness, through honest self-declaration, then consider that the determining factor.

This does mean that for some person like mitochondrial Eve, whom Byrne references and say we know without need for qualification she is female and a woman, I will believe her female since I know she had female gonads; I do not know but have no reason to believe she would have opted out; since I know only she is likely female, I will consider her likely a woman, and use she/her pronouns to describe her until I know better. Byrne references some newborn child with XX karyotype and a vagina; here again I will consider them likely female but I am not sure it is a good idea to speak of them as she, the girl, until they tell me so – here, in fact, would be somewhere we could shift the Overton window leftwards, a currently unacceptable proposal which would still be well motivated – consider no child a boy or a girl until they decide they are, do not speak of them as such, let their initial unchosen names be neutral. This is a position I will not fight for right now but that I favor in principle as a way to not simply let the bigots be the ones expanding the space of what is no longer too outlandish, it is sensible but not yet sellable.

For most people, they will not consciously self-identify as male or female, men or women, but they will be fine with the labels following from above scheme of disambiguation – anatomy, gonads, karyotype – and I will reference them as such unless I hear otherwise, or I have reason to believe perhaps they might in their heart of hearts be inclined to opt in or opt out of the default definition. This is seldom complicated. In everyday situations I don’t ask the receptionist their pronouns before speaking with them; I use names and other social cues to guess until I learn otherwise, but when I learn otherwise, I make damn sure to remember it.

For trans people (I won’t speak for intersex people here and now), we clearly made our choice: either to opt out of our AGAB, opt into our non-AGAB, or both. This already defines our (unqualified and biological) sex, even before we undergo any interventions (and not all of us do). We also occupy social spaces of man/womanhood, girl/boyhood. But beyond this, medical transition alters some of our sexed properties, as I outlined by example for myself above. When I finally have surgery, I will no longer be gonadally male, and yet another few percent of my tissues and structures will be anatomically female. With more years of hormone therapy, more of my gene expression patterns will change, and I will become slightly more physiologically female. We don’t know exactly what does and does not change. Some of my future research aims to test this. Not least in part because I can then determine better what technologies for transition we currently lack.

So in summary, I and my trans sisters are adult human females unless you specify, for example, karyotypic adult human females. I suppose Byrne can call me a karyotypic man if he wishes, and I would acknowledge this, but in the unqualified sense I am simply a woman. The whole kerfluffle of defending “adult human female” is irrelevant for these issues since we should problematize the concept of “female” itself including from a biological standpoint. Which is not the same as denying biology or erasing the needs of cis females. That research I mentioned? The other reason I want to do this is because I want to understand how hormonal and other factors make bodies sick and healthy in different ways in men and women (using here, as usually, the terms as statistic entities, and statements about them being statistical rather than essential in nature), so that the issues cis women have faced with inadequate medication and health advice, with increased mortality as a result, will be addressed. This is the opposite of either ignoring or failing to act on inequities resulting from biology.

(The above should also make clear something else I have alluded to. I do not see sex and gender as fully separate things. I see both as socially constructed. I see this social construction as being informed by biology, including the biology of brain and behaviour. I do not consider a sex/gender distinction particularly politically useful, and I see conceding “sex” as something immutable and binary and obvious as a dangerous mistake when made by trans activists.)

So then finally, back to where I was eventually heading, why does the combined discourse of Gliske and Byrne frighten me so? Not only on the practical level (access to transition healthcare), but on an existential level? It is because for me, core to my identity as a (trans) woman is that I need for others to see me as one. When they divide the world into men and women, I need for them to group me with the women (if no division is made, all fine!). I need for this to be heartfelt and honest, for them to genuinely apply any sex- and gender-differential emotion or action or phrasing to me exactly as they would to any cis woman. I will never perfectly have this, of course. And in the end, it is my own view of myself that matters most, but that view is informed by those around me. If society as a whole decides on a conceptualization of femaleness and of womanhood which I am excluded from, then I cannot feel at home.

I feel we have made very significant headway (but also some of it was always there – defining these terms from karyotype is a 20th century thing, definitions before that were likely anatomical but may have had strong social components too, especially in third gender cases) in propagating definitions that include trans people. “Trans women are women, trans men are men, non-binary people are both or neither as they say they are” is widespread enough to positively surprise me. Responses to Gliske (not so much to Byrne) from within his own scientific community echoes this already. We have made strides in visibility and recognition.

Trans-exclusive thinkers (feminist and otherwise) argue that changing definitions in this way comes at a cost. They reference (minuscule, bogeyman, but there you go) risks of abusers gaming the system to harm cis women, loss of sex-specific statistical knowledge (though at worst that is a 2-3% change in any measurement because we are very few), and the discomfort of cis women who have been traumatized by people who look like men and no longer feel safe with them around. Byrne, I am sure, along with others like him would complain there is a lack of simple elegance in my definition above, compared to something as simple as “both XX karyotype and a vagina”, and would argue this lack of elegance also is a cost, in a thought economy sense. Hilary Clinton feels it is awkward to have to expand her view of what womanhood can mean, and other old-school feminists feel their suffering under patriarchy is somehow not acknowledged as strongly if there are women who have not suffered all of it. Not a huge cost, any of this, but a small cost at least.

It is easy to show that what trans people experience under dysphoria – evidenced in our suicide attempt rate to date – is a much vaster cost than any of those minor encumbrances. It also outweighs easily – for many of us – the costs that come from the imperfections of current transition – being a target, as a non-passing trans person in a cisnormative patriarchal world, medical side effects, imperfect surgical options, generally loss of fertility along most paths. It is still easy to show that the scenario where we do transition, and where other people alter their definitions of men and women, male and female, so as to correctly include us, thereby removing main triggers of our dysphoria, is the one of most total utility and happiness. Cis people can suck up the inelegance of definition, the awkwardness of language, the slight fuzziness of statistics and the novelty of tall women washing their hands in a public restroom, because at least it means fewer trans people live in total despair.

But if something like what Gliske surely aims for becomes practice, and becomes widely believed to be an option for us to reduce symptoms of dysphoria? Would then more people side with Byrne, considering the encumbrances I mentioned more important than the remaining non-dysphoric reasons we have to transition? Fundamentally, is my wish to be recognized as a woman, in the absence of a clinical distress phenotype, still important enough to outweigh those encumbrances?

This is what I have been so distressed about. I fear it might not. I fear that my agency and wish will be considered secondary to minor comfort factors of cis people, and so that fewer people would see me as a woman, treat me as a woman, talk of me as a woman, include me as a woman.

The future is ahead of us. We cannot know where it will go. I will hope that allies and friends and family will see me and my kin as what we are regardless of what symptom treatment options will emerge, and that together we will keep the meme of my more inclusive definitions of male and female, of sex and gender, active in at least the societies where I can live. Perhaps we will lose some parts of the world, like there are parts we have yet to gain. There are countries I cannot visit. There may emerge more. I particularly worry about the US and UK, though I also frequently am hopeful.

Throughout these worries I thought of a term for that space where I am acknowledged as who I claim to be. Whether this is only my own immediate sphere of myself, that of my kin, friends, family, colleagues, city, country, expanding forwards, this space is Aeaea. This space is the sanctuary I may inhabit because it, unlike what is outside, is not forbidden to me while I remain myself. No matter who denounces us, Aeaea remains, and is as large as we make it. Here we are welcome, here we are safe.

luna reverse

Pitfall of morning twitter to wake; trans friends reposting TERF material to laugh at. Exposes me to it, sometimes rabbit holes me to identity threat dysphorically deconstruct and analyze. In this case, came to a clearer phrasing of what may be a useful insight, and which I had also pre-transition.

As noted, I use sex and gender interchangeably to reference human relating to (in action, perception, emotion, organizing…) people based on sexed characteristics, including biological and social ones, the latter including self-identification, overriding others via opt-out, opt-in. It is a social construct (so are chromosomes, says molecular biologist Sofia, but it is even clearer for “sex” as a whole). As culture and language shifts so does its meaning. To me and most people in the societies where I am at home, my sex is female, I am a woman. This is what matters most. To those with a more narrow definition (same-label contruct “sex” but referencing only some or a single bodily sexed properties like karyotype or position in a reproduction tree), I may not be.

The culture change is a shift towards the use I favor. Trans-exclusionary radical feminists (TERFs) centrally reject this shift, and demand the labels be narrowly defined to reference specific sexed bodily properties as essences of male/man, female/woman. In so doing they also deny the legitimacy of trans or cis modality (the latter by default) as they consider these properties unchangeable. This is a conflict which resolves eventually, and I think the presence of trans people in public spaces is how it is resolved, by anchoring our existence as fact in the eyes of the majority.

My hypothesis now is that a subset of assigned-female-at-birth (AFAB) TERFs (aside from conservatives, etc.) reject the label shift because in principle they are trans in denial. Specifically, AFAB agender nonbinary trans. This may sound arrogant and projecting. My view comes from having occupied an analogous space for long and recognizing the emotional tone of the rhetorics used. During my two decades identifying as agender, I would have subscribed largely to the TERF talking points of “gender is irrelevant” and “sex is solely specific biology and external oppression, otherwise empty of content”.

I would have subscribed to these as such a gender nihilism and sex minimalism made it possible for me to push away my discomfort with being seen (also by myself) as having male sex. My central dysphoria coping mechanism was the frantic denial of gender and the minimizing of the importance of sex (except an obstacle to be overcome by feminism). So long as I could do that I could function, though not happily. Any ascribing of any content to the gender/sex labels beyond that – unimportant biology, external oppression – felt terribly dysphoric, like being drowned or transformed into a non-being, like being forced into an identity that othered myself to myself.

Isn’t this exactly what drives a large segment of TERFs? Trans people (and I remember the very same fear and reaction myself) are terrible implications of a scenario of sex/gender being something more than that, an intrinsic rather than extrinsic identity. They like I cannot endure that idea because it is (socially, existentially) dysphoric.

What then is the solution? What this subset of TERFs need – freedom from a misaligned female/woman gender/sex assignment – is achievable by opt-out under the wider construct model: by considering themselves AFAB agender, the labels no longer will apply to them (and they will face the same challenges all other nonbinary trans people do, but this is already the case in their lives as they live in patriarchy with the rest of us). The oppressions many/most women face (externally by the actions of others, internally by our limited choice of role models, internally by properties such as having a uterus and an estrotypical body) are faced also by non-woman AFAB people, and we need to become better at recognizing and verbalizing this fact as part of the trans agenda. That is to say, AFAB nonwomen not passing as cis men experience misplaced misogyny (and AMAB women experience rightly placed misogyny variably depending on what we pass as).

So in the best of resolutions, the trans community should highlight and welcome agender people (AFAB and AMAB alike), recognize how a more complex (i.e. respecting opt-out, opt-in) sex/gender construct lets also those trans people reduce their dysphoria, and at the same time, not fail to highlight how under patriarchy, misogyny is directed both at women and at non-women being read as women. The fight against misogyny is ours to fight as feminists, all of us. We must also not fail to recognize specific challenges faced by uterus-bearing people (including many trans men). We do these things already, but we can get better at them. And in so doing, we are also creating a better home for those wayward agender siblings of ours currently shoring up the TERF ranks.

The issue thus, said TERFs demand to keep the sex/gender woman/man, male/female labels for their minimalist/nihilist project. But really their need is not as great – they need it only to negate it, and can accomplish the same by transitioning agender. Whereas for binary trans people as myself, we really cannot flourish at all without access to that label. So the only end point of this culture shift I can be OK with is the one I work towards. However, our opponents can, as outlined above, in many cases find equal flourishing there.

So you whose involuntary womanhood really does not define you other than as having XX karyotype and a uterus and experience of misogyny, and for whom any other labeling feels oppressive and painful, come be my agender trans sibling. Let’s fight patriarchy together.

spinnerettes

Was a little rabbit-hole triggered again, by the whole cis “I don’t feel gender and would not mind if mine was flipped“ idea. Wherein I’d reiterate, it’s about growing up. Trans alignment means on some level our socialization into our assigned gender cannot be completed. This does not mean crippling dysphoria from day one, only enough that our hearts are not in what we are becoming. This compounds over a childhood and teenagehood into being distanced from ourselves in a way which cis people are not. A flip of sexed body would not come with the results of a long process of socialization failure like this, but one being flipped at birth (as opposed to the putative trans brain flip before birth) probably would. And some fraction of people would be fine either way.

Took the progesterone. Sleep may have been better, felt somehow my body is a whole rather than parts throughout but thinking this is indirect. Observations continue.

termidin

The following is something I wrote to comment on a reddit post defending the use of the term “sex” to mean “reproductive sex”, under which saying “trans women are biologically male” would mean “trans women can only reproduce with cis women”. I think my points are valid. But I wrote them to clarify my own thought process. If I post them in response to the poster pedant, there would be a long angsty discussion that would drain me at a time when I have to be 100% at capacity. I need to let it go. So my response instead goes here.

The main weakness is that in practice, when it comes to animals, we often do use a “master construct” of “biological sex” which means all the different subcomponents being aligned and pointing in either direction. In humans, retaining that use is highly problematic. The thought of myself as “biologically male” is abhorrent even if it was entirely uncoupled from role and position and. It is furthermore important to me that I am like other women in regard to all those other biological sex characteristics. Reproduction is the least meaningful of the biological sex continua, really. So I work to be “female” in all biological regards I can.

As long as you use the terms “male” and “female” to denote reproductive compatibility in some two-sex reproduction systems, what you say is true in the sense that we could describe the same reality and your statements would not be inconsistent under your language framework. However it is not the only way we could choose to define those words.

To me as a (somewhat established, now moving in to work on sex hormones and how they impact systemic disease) biologist, there are no formal terms that just state unqualified “male” or “female”. There are terms of karyotypic, specific genetic, endocrine, transcriptional, anatomic etc. “male” and “female” and they each describe concepts that almost always are continua, often have bimodal distributions, often have overlaps in those distributions, and often are correlated with each other, correlations which break down under intersex and under transition. I do not refer to someone as just “male” or “female” without qualifying which regard I mean. As a trans woman, I am presently e.g. karyotypically male, endocrinologically closer to female, anatomically closer to male (which likely will change), etc. E.g. my anatomic and endocrine sexes are not the same, and I don’t recognize as useful any master contruct of biological sex above the individual properties, if I want to talk about the correlation structure I can just do that directly.

When I do use unqualified “male” or “female” about humans in everyday speech it is not as a scientific term, it is intended to be understood as shorthand for the constructs of “man” and “woman” and carry the same opt-out, opt-in clauses as those do for me. More and more people are using language in this way, inside and outside of science and medicine, and I think it is good that we do. For lab animals in order to be quickly understood I will still use “female mice” e.g. as a short-hand for XX mice, e.g. in the sense of “ovarectomized female mice were supplemented with E2, then assessed for tumor growth”. But sex so used is a short-hand I neither need nor want for humans, and the animal use case is also an area where scientific terminology well may come to shift over the next decades.

If I wanted to address specifically what you talk of, I would talk of “reproductive sex” (leaving aside complexities that vary within and across species). I don’t think any practical utility is lost, whereas some is gained, by having that specified.

How do I start being consistent? Well, where space allows, and where I have enough clout (I don’t always), I might start specifying “genetically male mice” (implying endocrinology and anatomy following, even where we might alter both of these). Probably just using “genetically male/female” per default. It feels like a cop-out because then I am still using the ghost of the master construct, assuming typical development as it were, but if the alternative is full descriptive: “genetically, anatomically and endocrinologically male mice” which is too long, or unqualified, I’ll try to push this alternate term. Let’s see if it ends up in a paper sooner of later.

Looking back into thread, OP is providing amazing responses to this that are better than mine and I want to meet her and buy her drinks. That aside, the insight with regards to the animals is important and I should get to work on that.

Another comment in the thread makes the claim that someone’s womanhood is about whether others treat them so. As with sex and gender both, I want them at least implicitly qualified to who it is that assigns. And my sex, and my gender, if the two are not symbolic links to each other, is about how I label myself. Others inform that label. But stating I am not a woman in Texas because the Texans would not see me so does not match my use of the term. I am one equally there, in the sense that my own labeling of my own sexed body remains there.

Need to regain focus and grasp hold on that science so it can get to where I need it.

aspects & agency

Still in a state of somewhat movedness. Basically, I’m reminded that why there may well be clear and defined biological bases for my gender identity and for how my mind improves on sufficient estrogen, I cannot show this easily. The CAH research has the issues one would fear in that the surgeries they get might confound, for example, the guevesdoces findings etc. similarly may be confounded, and so forth. Data match my model but also match other models.

It’s clear that part of the reason I want to do multi-omics studies on HRT are to somehow demonstrate my validity in these regard; verify there is some trans neurology property which causes dysphoria unless hormonally treated. Perhaps I will. But I really must let go of that need, I cannot let it hold me back.

So instead, what to consider? Certainly my personal trajectory, my identity evolution, my dysphoria and my transition do not happen in any vacuum. It would look different under other circumstances and in another time period or culture. I even knowingly in part let myself construct it drawing on others around me. That does not make it any less important, or genuine, or beneficial to me. It remains that it improves my circumstances. This remains true even if there would turn out to have been other paths that could have made me function. It is also an ongoing process of evolution.

Some part of me still feels shame when confronted with the implicit or explicit question why I take part in any construct involving gender, as though its total ignoring and rejection would be the saner choice. For whatever reason, that doesn’t work for me. My emotions won’t work, I won’t be happy unless I live and embody and fully belong to womanhood. Whether this was there from the beginning or developed during my life, it is true. Regardless of my politics it is true. I don’t feel like being ashamed of it.

Instead then in comparison with gender/sex, I will reference another social construct built around biological “realities“, namely parenthood.

It’s extremely central in our societies, even if it varies between them. People often structure their lives around it. Laws and social frameworks assist and protect it. Fundamental laws around names and property and belonging are informed by it. Some cultures have parents changing their names to reflect their parenthood, including for adopted children.

It has a deeply fundamental place in mythology and memetics, and we tend to believe in and experience instincts and involuntary mental states around it. These are constructed and likely informed by some biological basis. It ties into sex and love and pair bonds, and we let it sometimes change and damage our bodies.

The urge towards it is regarded as biological reality (and likely its basis is similarly muddled and unclear as gender identity, with conflicting evidence, likely something there to be found, profound impact, and cultural variability).

It involves major sacrifices and life changes, affecting not only the person but also other people and society as a whole, sometimes in really costly manner. It ties into many other identity facets and social constructs.

Its meaning and motivation varies between the individuals who choose it, and that is something constructed in our social groups – cultures, clans, peer groups. Some people do subversive variants. Some do it despite it not being so practical then and there. Some people do conventional variants in spite of their politics and feel shame for it.

Some people cannot do it using their own biology without help, or at all. We generally recognize the validity of what they create without question, except that there exists a vocal activist fringe – anti-adoption voices – who does not.

Some people end up having genetic children without deciding to. In some cases they see themselves and are seen as parents regardless. In some cases they do not see themselves so, and others often agree but not always. In other cases it is decided, and acknowledged. And in yet others, again, children are not genetic but parenthood was decided on and respected – was constructed, as the biology has an opt-out/opt-in clause in both modern and ancient societies in this regard.

The analogy with gender, of course, is clear. And my possessing and acting on a female gender identity – to the point of requesting recognition from the world, and to the point of letting it affect my life situation, name and reproductive anatomy – is analogous to the choice that most people in the world make to become parents. I’m no less sane than they are.

proud nail

In many regards I have always genuinely wanted to be odd, different, special, to not fit in, to stand out. I certainly don’t mind it. I usually don’t want to be normal. This also means that in and of itself, I don’t mind being trans, don’t mind how being trans rather than cis makes me a minority. I have no drive to not stand out in that regard.

Except indirectly I do. Because I do have a drive to not be different, a failure, inferior, in regards to the statistical distribution of women. Only in my identity as a woman do I crave not to be abnormal, not to be a freak. I want to be a weird and abnormal human, but not for my weirdness to make me weird with respect to my womanhood. So indirectly I would crave to be cis rather than trans, because most women are cis rather than trans, so being a cis woman would make me less unlike other women.

So all in all, there are some few ways in which I do have an instinct to fit in. Gender is one. Whereas otherwise I usually do not. This I find relevant.

flow of things

Sort of want to describe in detail but not cool enough to stop and describe?

Kink party on NYE was delightful, more tantra-inspired things and other stuff that was validating, while also nowhere near what I would have hoped to experience. Future will bring further experiences still though.

Pronouns and names from people being wrong feels wrong more often. Continuing to grate, and probably will increase up until the point I am bothered enough to take action to change it.

Spent some time feeling worried if my experience as transitioning into a gender somehow is a more (self-audienced) performative experience than the gendered lives of cis people are. But probably letting that worry fade and rest for now, it doesn’t seem so useful.

theorizing

Model: For some significant fraction of trans people the following thing holds: gendered self-socialization is impeded and flawed because mismatch between assigned gender and innate gender identity potential. From this stems a lot of the comorbidities and components including anxiety, depression and dissociation. Transition helps in part by allowing successful gendered self-socialization absent this mismatch.

Predictions:

– Success of transition in reducing discomfort would be helped by doing this second socialization in a supportive community, less efficient otherwise. Transitioning body and brain would not solve all things immediately. Long-time gender anchoring might.

– A sex-transitioned cis adult would often not gain severe dysphoria overnight, and might not as often have it as bad as someone growing up and maladapting under a gender mismatch.

– I long thought trans comorbidity with autism was due to autism making such self-socialization harder. But perhaps it is reverse? That is, trans might be an autism risk factor, not the reverse. Then one might expect that there would exist autism gene markers _less_ common among trans autists than other autists. Also, just learned (more work from Melissa Hines) CAH, who are usually cis but unusually often trans, are not more often autistic.

I think some of these may bear out.